Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1240204
 
 

References (12)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



A Political Economy Model of Merger Policy in International Markets


Massimo Motta


Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Michele Ruta


European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO); Columbia Business School - Economics Department; Economic Research Division, WTO

June 2008

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6894

Abstract:     
This paper looks at the political economy of merger policy under autarky and in international markets. We assume that merger policy is decided by antitrust authorities (whose objective is to maximize welfare) but can be influenced by governments, which are subject to lobbying by the firms (be they insiders or outsiders to the merger). We argue that political economy distortions may explain some of the recently observed merger policy conflicts between authorities and politicians, as well as between institutions belonging to different countries. We illustrate our analysis with applications motivated by recent merger cases, which have been widely debated in the international press.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Antitrust policy, European Union, Lobbying, Mergers

JEL Classification: D72, F59, H11, L40

working papers series


Date posted: August 20, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Motta, Massimo and Ruta, Michele, A Political Economy Model of Merger Policy in International Markets (June 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6894. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1240204

Contact Information

Massimo Motta (Contact Author)
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
Michele Ruta
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )
Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://www.iue.it/ECO/People/Fellows/MarieCurieFellows.shtml
Columbia Business School - Economics Department ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
Economic Research Division, WTO ( email )
Rue de Lausanne 154
CH-1211 Geneva
Switzerland
HOME PAGE: http://www.iue.it/Personal/Fellows/MicheleRuta/Welcome.htm
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