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The Pigou Problem


John V. Nye


George Mason University - Department of Economics; National Research University Higher School of Economics

August, 20 2008

Regulation, Vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 2008

Abstract:     
This article calls into question the Pigovian justifications for higher taxes on goods and services that generate negative externalities. Insisting on a Pigovian tax as a precautionary measure only makes sense if it replaces all preexisting subsidies, taxes, and regulations rather than being added on top of existing arrangements. The relevant issue is whether the activities causing the externality are at their socially optimal level.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: Pigovian tax, Pigou, taxation, tax, externalities, externality, transfers, regulation, global warming, pollution, gasoline, coase,

JEL Classification: D00, D6, D62, H00, H2, H20, H21, H23

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Date posted: August 22, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Nye, John V., The Pigou Problem (August, 20 2008). Regulation, Vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1241542

Contact Information

John V. C. Nye (Contact Author)
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-4272 (Phone)
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, RI Moscow 119017
Russia

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