|
||||
|
||||
The Effect of Reputation and Competition on the Advice of Real Estate Agents
Hilde Patron State University of West Georgia Kenneth Roskelley Department of Finance & Economics Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2008 Abstract: We study a two-period bargaining game where buyers and sellers employ real estate agents to help them determine the sales price of a house. We find that agents are less likely to provide aggressive bargaining advice to their client when they receive percentage commissions and when they work for the buyer. In addition, we find that agents are less likely to suggest aggressive bargaining strategies when there is little market competition, the gains to trade are large, in markets where housing values appreciate slowly, and when dual agency is permitted. More importantly, we show that an agent is more likely to bargain aggressively and capture a portion of the gains to trade for a client when the house's sales price is closely related to the agent's reputation and future business (referrals).
Keywords: bargaining game, real estate agent, reputation Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: August 22, 2008 ; Last revised: August 22, 2008Suggested Citation |
|
|||||||
© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was served by apollo5b in 0.281 seconds.