Breaking Commons Cartels

Abstract:     
Scholars and others concerned with resource management typically celebrate pathways to stability and cooperation in the commons. Within this celebratory literature, Elinor Ostrom's principles of long-enduring institutions have become recognized as a landmark achievement. This article reexamines stable commons institutions generally and Ostrom's principles specifically. While these principles undoubtedly have helped identify ways to build stable institutions, they have an unexplored downside. Specifically, when our values change, stable institutions can thwart new values from making headway in the commons. A number of scholars have used game theory to explain the power of institutions to resolve problems plaguing the commons. However, the game theory used thus far does not take into account that how we value the commons is subject to change. Using conventional game theory to describe the power of institutions to govern the commons, the article extends that theory and highlights a dark side of institutions.

Keywords: commons, CPRs, Common-pool resources, game theory, new institutionalism, institutions, tragic institutions, tragedy of the commons, common pool resources, institutional rigidity, institutional lock-in, tragedy of the commons, competing values, rival uses, natural resources

JEL Classifications: A13, C72, D23, H41, K11, K32, N51, N52, Q28, Q38

Working Paper Series