Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259329
 


 



Learning the Type of the Opponent in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests with Asymmetric Information


Ganna Pogrebna


Columbia University

June 1, 2008


Abstract:     
In a competitive environment players often face uncertainty about the relative strength of their opponents. This paper considers a winner-take-all rent-seeking contest between two players with different costs of effort. Costs of effort are private knowledge, however, players have an opportunity to learn the opponent's type by engaging in either private (the opponent does not know about the information acquisition) or public (the opponent knows about the information acquisition) learning. We show that a situation, when one player learns the type of the opponent privately while the opponent abstains from learning cannot be an equilibrium. Yet, there exists an equilibrium, when one player engages in public learning and the other refrains from learning.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: Imperfectly discriminating contests, asymmetric information

JEL Classification: D72, D82

working papers series


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Date posted: August 26, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Pogrebna, Ganna, Learning the Type of the Opponent in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests with Asymmetric Information (June 1, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259329 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1259329

Contact Information

Ganna Pogrebna (Contact Author)
Columbia University ( email )
419 Schermerhorn Hall
New York, NY 10027
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.gannapogrebna.com
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