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Regulatory Structure under EC Competition Laws: Lessons for India

Tarun Jain

Supreme Court of India; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); National Law University Jodhpur (NLUJ)

December 1, 2011

Manupatra Competition Law Reports, Vols. 2(3), pp. B289-B297, 2011

The competition law rules are of immense importance for optimal functioning of the economic variables as they not only vouchsafe against the monopolistic and exploitative tendencies of the bigger market players, they are also instrumental in providing the smaller and newer entrants in the markets to work towards achieving self-sustaining levels. However, their operation is contingent upon position sought to be obtained in the markets for which these rules are designed. While these rules may vary depending upon jurisdiction, nonetheless the essential premise remains the same. In this backdrop this article examines the regulatory structure in vogue under the EC competition law and to identify the key traits which may as well be applicable for the recently formulated Competition Commission of India, in its quest towards rendering competition workable in the Indian markets.

The Chapterization is as under:

1. Introduction

2. Regulatory Structure under EC competition laws
2.1 The legal regime for competition in EC
2.2 The EC Regulatory Authorities
2.2.1 EC Commission
2.2.2 The Advisory Committee
2.2.3 National Competition Authorities & European Competition Network

3. Lessons for India
3.1 Regulatory Structure under the Competition Act, 2002
3.2 Lessons from the EC model for India

4. Conclusion

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

Keywords: India, EC, Competition law

JEL Classification: K21, K40

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Date posted: August 28, 2008 ; Last revised: January 16, 2012

Suggested Citation

Jain, Tarun, Regulatory Structure under EC Competition Laws: Lessons for India (December 1, 2011). Manupatra Competition Law Reports, Vols. 2(3), pp. B289-B297, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260148

Contact Information

Tarun Jain (Contact Author)
Supreme Court of India ( email )
New Delhi
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)
United Kingdom
National Law University Jodhpur (NLUJ)
Feedback to SSRN

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