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On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price RigidityErnst FehrUniversity of Zurich - Department of Economics Martin BrownUniversity of St. Gallen, Swiss Institute of Banking and Finance Christian ZehnderUniversity of Lausanne July 2008 Abstract: We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterized by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by increasing contract efficiency substantially. This effect is, however, associated with a considerable bilateralisation of market interactions, suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities. Surprisingly, reputation in fact weakens the wage and price rigidities arising from social preferences. Thus, in markets characterized by moral hazard, reputational incentives unambiguously increase mutually beneficial exchanges, reduce rents, and render markets more responsive to supply and demand shocks.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32 Keywords: Reputation, Reciprocity, Relational Contracts, Price Rigidity, Wage Rigidity JEL Classification: D82, J3, J41, E24, C9 working papers seriesDate posted: August 28, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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