SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

References (60)

Beta

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

How Do Electoral Systems Affect Fiscal Policy? Evidence from State and Local Governments, 1890 to 2005

Patricia Funk
Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Christina Gathmann
Stanford University; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)


June 18, 2009


Abstract:     
Using a new data set from 1890 to 2000, we estimate how the adoption of proportional representation affects policies in Swiss cantons. We show that proportional systems shift spending toward broad goods (e.g. education and welfare bene…fits) but decrease spending on targetable goods (e.g. roads and agricultural subsidies). We …find little evidence that proportional representation increases the size of government. We also demonstrate that compositional changes of the legislature, i.e. party fragmentation and better representation of left-wing parties, are associated with more spending. The direct electoral incentives of proportional rule appear to reduce government spending.

Keywords: Electoral System, Proportional Rule, Fiscal Policy, Switzerland

JEL Classifications: H11, H52, H53, N44

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 03, 2008 ; Last revised: June 22, 2009

Suggested Citation

Funk, Patricia and Gathmann, Christina, How Do Electoral Systems Affect Fiscal Policy? Evidence from State and Local Governments, 1890 to 2005 (June 18, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260446


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Christina Gathmann (Contact Author)
Stanford University ( email )
CHP/PCOR
117 Encina Commons
Stanford, CA 94305-6019
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
D-53072 Bonn Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )
Poschinger Str. 5
DE-81679 Munich Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~cgathman
Patricia Funk
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
+34 94 5421942 (Phone)
+34 93 5421746 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 143
Downloads: 58
Download Rank: 110,678
References: 60

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo4 in 0.109 seconds.