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Information Spillovers and Performance Persistence for Hedge Funds


Vincent Glode


University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department; University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Richard C. Green


Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

October 6, 2010

Published in the Journal of Financial Economics (JFE)

Abstract:     
We present a simple model that rationalizes performance persistence in hedge fund limited partnerships. In contrast to the model for mutual funds of Berk and Green (2004), the learning in our model pertains to profitability associated with an innovative trading strategy or an emerging sector, rather than ability specific to the fund manager. As a result of potential information spillovers, which would increase competition in the sector if informed investors were to partner with nonincumbent managers, incumbent managers will let informed investors benefit from increases in estimated profitability following high returns realized with the trading strategy or in the sector.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: Hedge Funds, Performance, Information Spillover

JEL Classification: G23, G24, D82

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: August 29, 2008 ; Last revised: December 7, 2011

Suggested Citation

Glode, Vincent and Green, Richard C., Information Spillovers and Performance Persistence for Hedge Funds (October 6, 2010). Published in the Journal of Financial Economics (JFE). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260952

Contact Information

Vincent Glode (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
Richard C. Green
Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )
315B Schenley Park
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-2302 (Phone)
412-268-7064 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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