Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1261011
 
 

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Design Principles of a Cap and Trade System for Greenhouse Gases


Tim Profeta


Duke University - Nicholas School for the Environment

Brigham Daniels


Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School

December 2005

Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions Working Paper

Abstract:     
Until recently, the question of regulating greenhouse gases was a question for nations. Over the past few years an increasing number of states and municipalities have shown an interest in grappling with climate change. This paper attempts to help states, and specifically California, to formulate an effective cap-and-trade program by highlighting the most important design features and the tradeoffs associated with policy alternatives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Keywords: Climate change, global warming, Kyoto, California, cap-and-trade, environment, greenhouse gas

JEL Classification: K32, K23, L50, Q28, Q38, Q48, Q25

working papers series


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Date posted: September 1, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Profeta, Tim and Daniels, Brigham, Design Principles of a Cap and Trade System for Greenhouse Gases (December 2005). Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1261011 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1261011

Contact Information

Tim Profeta
Duke University - Nicholas School for the Environment ( email )
Box 90328
Durham, NC 27708-0328
United States
Brigham Daniels (Contact Author)
Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School ( email )
430 JRCB
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
United States
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