Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1264025
 
 

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Comparative Vigilance: A Simple Guide


Allan M. Feldman


Brown University - Department of Economics

Ram Singh


University of Delhi - Delhi School of Economics

September 3, 2008


Abstract:     
In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard comparative negligence rule. Unlike standard liability rules, however, when both parties are vigilant (i.e., taking more care than is efficient), the rule provides for liability shares that depend on the parties' degrees of vigilance. Moreover, when one party is negligent and the other is non-negligent, our rule provides for variable liability shares, that respond to both carefulness and carelessness of the parties. Our liability rule is equitable; it has no discontinuity at the efficient point where both parties are just meeting their standards of care; and it provides incentives that guarantee the injurer and victim will choose the efficient care levels. This paper does not include theorems and proofs; rather it explains the results with the aid of a simple example, laid out in an easy 3 x 3 table.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: comparative vigilance, equity, economic efficiency, tort liability rules, Nash equilibrium, social costs, pure comparative vigilance, super-symmetric rule.

JEL Classification: K13, D61

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Date posted: September 7, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Feldman, Allan M. and Singh, Ram, Comparative Vigilance: A Simple Guide (September 3, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1264025 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1264025

Contact Information

Allan M. Feldman (Contact Author)
Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )
64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-2415 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)
Ram Singh
University of Delhi - Delhi School of Economics ( email )
Delhi School of Economics
University of Delhi, North Campus
Delhi-110007, Delhi 110007
India
HOME PAGE: http://www.econdse.org/faculty/ram/ram.htm
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