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Parallel Search, Incentives and Problem Type: Revisiting the Competition and Innovation Link

Kevin Boudreau
London Business School

Nicola Lacetera
Case Western Reserve University - Weatherhead School of Management

Karim Lakhani
Harvard Business School


September 5, 2008

Harvard Business School Technology & Operations Mgt. Unit Research Paper No. 1264038

Abstract:     
This paper presents econometric evidence of two independent effects of adding more competitors on innovation: 1) a competition effect whereby increasing rivalry shapes, and often decreases, incentives to expend effort and invest in innovation; and 2) a parallel search effect whereby adding greater numbers of searchers benefits innovation by broadening the search for solutions. We further show the importance of these effects depends on the nature of the innovation problem being solved. The analysis uses data from TopCoder's software contest platform, on which elite software developers were assigned different problems to solve within assigned groups of direct competitors. Econometric relationships are identified by exploiting random assignment and a separate instrumental variables procedure.

Keywords: competition, innovation, problem solving, search, complexity, distributed innovation, platforms

JEL Classifications: L1, L86, 03

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 07, 2008 ; Last revised: October 27, 2008

Suggested Citation

Boudreau, Kevin, Lacetera, Nicola and Lakhani, Karim R., Parallel Search, Incentives and Problem Type: Revisiting the Competition and Innovation Link (September 5, 2008). Harvard Business School Technology & Operations Mgt. Unit Research Paper No. 1264038. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1264038


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Contact Information

Kevin Boudreau (Contact Author)
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
Nicola Lacetera
Case Western Reserve University - Weatherhead School of Management ( email )
10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106-7235
United States
Karim R. Lakhani
Harvard Business School ( email )
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6741 (Phone)
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