Abstract

 
 

References (103)



 


 



Conservatism Measures that Control for the Effects of Economic Rents on Stock Returns


Judson Caskey


University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business

Kyle Peterson


University of Oregon - Charles H. Lundquist School of Business

February 22, 2013

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Recent studies show that regression-based estimates of accounting conservatism reflect both differences in the asymmetric recognition of bad news and differences in asset composition. In particular, a firm’s market value and returns reflect both assets-in-place and expected future rents, while book values tend to reflect only assets-in-place. We propose two tests that remove the effect of asset composition on cross-sectional comparisons of accounting conservatism. First, a test based on a ratio of regression coefficients allows for valid cross-sectional comparisons of conservatism relative to overall news recognition. Second, in some cases, researchers can separately identify and make cross-sectional comparisons of the fraction of good news recognized and the fraction of bad news recognized. The estimates in this second scenario use a regression of earnings on returns interacted with a book-to-market ratio. We validate our model by deriving and testing several predictions based on it.

Keywords: Accounting conservatism, asymmetric timeliness, market-to-book ratio, returns-earnings relation

JEL Classification: M41, G10, G30, N20

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: September 11, 2008 ; Last revised: March 5, 2013

Suggested Citation

Caskey, Judson and Peterson, Kyle, Conservatism Measures that Control for the Effects of Economic Rents on Stock Returns (February 22, 2013). Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1266787 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1266787

Contact Information

Judson Caskey (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business ( email )
1 University Station, B6400
Austin, TX 78712
United States
(512)551-2796 (Phone)
Kyle Peterson
University of Oregon - Charles H. Lundquist School of Business ( email )
1208 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403-1208
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 921

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.375 seconds