Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267202
 
 

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New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations


Robert H. Lande


University of Baltimore - School of Law

2010

University of Baltimore School of Law Legal Studies Research
Alabama Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 3, 2010

Abstract:     
Illinois Brick held that only direct purchasers successfully can sue for damages under federal antitrust law. Since this left most true victims of antitrust violations without an effective remedy, most states enacted Illinois Brick Repealers (IBRs), to give indirect purchasers the right to sue for damages when firms violate analogous state laws.

Although many benefits would arise if national legislation overturned Illinois Brick, to date every attempt to achieve a comprehensive federal solution has failed. Because this thirty year stalemate is almost certain to continue, this article instead focused on reform at the state level, where reform is much more achievable.

This article presents a large number of IBR options that address the spectrum of a state's potential needs, together with commentary giving the major effects, advantages and disadvantages of each. As its Conclusion, this article suggests its own Model State Illinois Brick Repealer legislation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: antitrust, Illinois Brick, damages, price fixing, cartel, consumers, indirect purchasers, direct purchasers, state antitrust

JEL Classification: K21, L4

working papers series


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Date posted: September 14, 2008 ; Last revised: March 15, 2010

Suggested Citation

Lande, Robert H., New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations (2010). University of Baltimore School of Law Legal Studies Research; Alabama Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 3, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267202 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1267202

Contact Information

Robert H. Lande (Contact Author)
University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )
1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States
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