Secretaries of Pork? A New Theory of Distributive Public Policy
Anthony M. Bertelli
USC Price School of Public Policy; USC Gould School of Law; University of Birmingham
Christian R. Grose
University of Southern California
September 12, 2008
Journal of Politics, Forthcoming
Scholars have focused attention toward congressional influence over distributive grant allocations, though have less frequently examined the extent to which administrative agencies play a role in that process. We present a new theory of ideology-contingent executive decisionmaking within a multiple-principals framework to explain the geographic distribution of policy benefits. Our theory is novel in that it locates inter-branch ideological conflict and confluence at the center of bureaus' allocational strategies. Discretionary Department of Labor (DOL) grants and Department of Defense (DOD) contracts from 1991-2002 are examined to provide evidence that agencies deliver more grants to senators with proximate ideologies. To measure bureaucratic ideology, we generate comparable ideology estimates for cabinet secretaries, presidents, and members of the U.S. Senate via an item response model. Our findings suggest that ideological congruence between senators and DOL or DOD is associated with significantly larger amounts of grants or contracts respectively. These findings are important as they recast our understanding of distributive politics into ideological terms.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 40
Keywords: Pork-barrel politics, Ideal Point Estimation, Public Policy, Congress, Executive Politics, Presidency
JEL Classification: H50, H57Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 14, 2008 ; Last revised: November 30, 2008
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.500 seconds