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Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause


Andrew Koppelman


Northwestern University School of Law


William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 50, 2008
Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 08-32

Abstract:     
Government neutrality toward religion is based on familiar considerations: the importance of avoiding religious conflict, alienation of religious minorities, and the danger that religious considerations will introduce a dangerous irrational dogmatism into politics and make democratic compromise more difficult. This paper explores one consideration, prominent at the time of the framing, that is often overlooked: the idea that religion can be corrupted by state involvement with it. This idea is friendly to religion but, precisely for that reason, is determined to keep the state away from religion.

If the religion-protective argument for disestablishment is to be useful today, it cannot be adopted in the form in which it was understood in the 17th and 18th centuries, because in that form it is loaded with assumptions rooted in a particular variety of Protestant Christianity. Nonetheless, suitably revised, it provides a powerful reason for government, as a general matter, to keep its hands off religious doctrine. It offers the best explanation for many otherwise mysterious rules of Establishment Clause law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 106

Keywords: Religion, Constitutional Law, Establishment Clause

JEL Classification: K19

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Date posted: September 19, 2008 ; Last revised: May 10, 2009

Suggested Citation

Koppelman, Andrew, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause. William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 50, 2008; Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 08-32. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1268406

Contact Information

Andrew M. Koppelman (Contact Author)
Northwestern University School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-8431 (Phone)
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