Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270178
 
 

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Central Bank: The Chexsystems(Sm) Qualifile(R) Decision


Dennis Campbell


Harvard Business School

Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez


University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy

Emily McClintock Ekins


Cato Institute; Reason Foundation

Peter Tufano


University of Oxford - Said Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

July 19, 2007

HBS Case No.: 208-029

Abstract:     
SUBJECT AREAS: Banking, Commercial banking, Customer acquisition, Risk management.

The "Central Bank" series analyzes the use of information and product design for managing the counterparty risk of newly acquired customers. Central Bank, a mid-sized regional U.S. bank, was attempting to grow its customer base by increasing the number of new checking accounts. Like many banks, Central saw checking accounts as an important tool for customer acquisition and loyalty-building. However, the bank realized that the aggressive pursuit of new accounts could result in an increased number of overdrafts and, ultimately, customer defaults. The first case, "Central Bank: The ChexSystems(SM) QualiFile(R) Decision," analyzes how QualiFile, a debit scoring product commercialized by ChexSystems, can be used to manage this risk.

working papers series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: September 18, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Campbell, Dennis and Martinez-Jerez, Francisco de Asis and Ekins, Emily McClintock and Tufano, Peter, Central Bank: The Chexsystems(Sm) Qualifile(R) Decision (July 19, 2007). HBS Case No.: 208-029. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270178

Contact Information

Dennis Campbell (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez
University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy ( email )
Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States
Emily McClintock Ekins
Cato Institute ( email )
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001-5403
United States
Reason Foundation ( email )
United States
Peter Tufano
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 (0) 1865 288551 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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