Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270281
 
 

References (31)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption: A Note on Wealth as a Corruption-Controlling Device


Rafael Di Tella


Harvard Business School - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Federico Weinschelbaum


University of San Andres

0000

The Economic Journal, Vol. 118, Issue 532, pp. 1552-1571, October 2008

Abstract:     
There are a large number of cases where corruption has been discovered when investigating levels of consumption that appear to be hard to justify. The informativeness of an agent's level of consumption depends on his legal income and initial level of wealth, as conspicuous consumption by wealthy agents leads to little updating of the principal's belief about their honesty. This introduces a tendency to prefer poor agents as they are easier to monitor. More generally, we describe the basic problem of choosing agents and monitoring consumption with the aim of reducing corruption, and discuss features of the practical applications.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Accepted Paper Series





Date posted: September 19, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Di Tella, Rafael and Weinschelbaum, Federico, Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption: A Note on Wealth as a Corruption-Controlling Device (0000). The Economic Journal, Vol. 118, Issue 532, pp. 1552-1571, October 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270281 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02180.x

Contact Information

Rafael Di Tella (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit ( email )
Cambridge, MA
United States
617-495-5048 (Phone)
617-496-5985 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/rditella/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Federico Weinschelbaum
University of San Andres ( email )
Vito Dumas 284
(1644) Victoria, Pcia
Buenos Aires
Argentina
54-11-4725-7041 (Phone)
54-11-4725-7010 (Fax)
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