Is Pay-for-Performance Detrimental to Innovation?
Yale University - School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business
October 31, 2012
Management Science, Vol. 59, Issue 7, pp. 1496-1513, July 2013
Previous research in economics shows that compensation based on the pay-for-performance principle is effective in inducing higher levels of effort and productivity. On the other hand, research in psychology argues that performance-based financial incentives inhibit creativity and innovation. How should managerial compensation be structured if the goal is to induce managers to pursue more innovative business strategies? In a controlled laboratory setting, we provide evidence that the combination of tolerance for early failure and reward for long-term success is effective in motivating innovation. Subjects under such an incentive scheme explore more and are more likely to discover a novel business strategy than subjects under fixed-wage and standard pay-for-performance incentive schemes. We also find evidence that the threat of termination can undermine incentives for innovation, while golden parachutes can alleviate these innovation-reducing effects.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 37
Keywords: innovation, incentives, exploration, tolerance for failure, experiments
JEL Classification: M52, O31, C91, M13
Date posted: September 23, 2008 ; Last revised: January 13, 2015
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