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Adjusting Linear Information Models for the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings*

Sebastian Gell
University of Cologne

Carsten Homburg
University of Cologne

Julia Nasev
Stanford University


June 1, 2008

AAA 2009 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Paper

Abstract:     
We provide evidence that conditional conservatism could be better captured in linear information models (LIMs), which largely rely on analysts' forecasts, if analysts would adjust their optimistic forecast for the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Since adjusting the forecast requires information of the next period the adjusted model could be regarded as a benchmark to investigate conditional conservatism in LIMs. We demonstrate that for a joint parameter estimation of the Choi/O'Hanlon/Pope (2006) model based on adjusted forecasts valuation errors are reduced. For a market-to-book specific implementation the adjusted model improves valuation errors for the 30% highest conservative firms. Moreover, the adjustment reduces the asymmetric timeliness in the valuation error indicating that the adjusted model helps capturing conditional conservatism. Our results imply that LIMs will benefit from an adjustment for conditional conservatism particularly in the case of a joint parameter estimation and when concern is with high conservative firms.

Keywords: Linear Information Model, Ohlson Model, Accounting Conservatism, Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings, Basu (1997), Conditional Conservatism

JEL Classifications: G29, M41, M44, D82, G14

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 20, 2008 ; Last revised: April 08, 2009

Suggested Citation

Gell, Sebastian, Homburg, Carsten and Nasev, Julia, Adjusting Linear Information Models for the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings* (June 1, 2008). AAA 2009 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270749


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Contact Information

Julia Nasev (Contact Author)
Stanford University ( email )
Graduate School of Business
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 49305
United States
+1 650 7364306 (Phone)
Sebastian Gell
University of Cologne ( email )
Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne 50923
Germany
Carsten Homburg
University of Cologne ( email )
Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne 50923
Germany
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