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Multiple Votes, Ballot Truncation and the Two-Party System: An ExperimentArnaud DellisUniversite Laval - Department of Economics; CIRPEE Sean T. D'EvelynUniversity of Hawaii at Manoa - Department of Economics Katerina SherstyukUniversity of Hawaii at Manoa - Department of Economics September 21, 2008 Abstract: Countries that elect their policy-makers by means of Plurality Voting tend to have a two-party system. We conduct laboratory experiments to study whether alternative voting procedures yield a two-party system as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow voters to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that both Plurality and Approval Voting yield a two-party system, whereas Dual Voting may yield a multi-party system due to strategic voting. Voters' ability to truncate ballots (not cast all their votes) is essential for maintaining the two-party system under Approval Voting.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 53 Keywords: Strategic voting, Approval Voting, Ballot truncation, Duverger's law JEL Classification: C72, C9, D72 working papers seriesDate posted: September 23, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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