Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271692
 
 

References (47)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Multiple Votes, Ballot Truncation and the Two-Party System: An Experiment


Arnaud Dellis


Universite Laval - Department of Economics; CIRPEE

Sean T. D'Evelyn


University of Hawaii at Manoa - Department of Economics

Katerina Sherstyuk


University of Hawaii at Manoa - Department of Economics

September 21, 2008


Abstract:     
Countries that elect their policy-makers by means of Plurality Voting tend to have a two-party system. We conduct laboratory experiments to study whether alternative voting procedures yield a two-party system as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow voters to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that both Plurality and Approval Voting yield a two-party system, whereas Dual Voting may yield a multi-party system due to strategic voting. Voters' ability to truncate ballots (not cast all their votes) is essential for maintaining the two-party system under Approval Voting.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: Strategic voting, Approval Voting, Ballot truncation, Duverger's law

JEL Classification: C72, C9, D72

working papers series


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Date posted: September 23, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Dellis, Arnaud and D'Evelyn, Sean T. and Sherstyuk, Katerina, Multiple Votes, Ballot Truncation and the Two-Party System: An Experiment (September 21, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271692 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1271692

Contact Information

Arnaud Dellis (Contact Author)
Universite Laval - Department of Economics ( email )
1250 Ave Sciences-Humaines, local 2174
Quebec, Quebec G1V 0A6
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/arnauddellis/
CIRPEE ( email )
Pavillon De Sève
Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://132.203.59.36/CIRPEE/index_en.html
Sean T. D'Evelyn
University of Hawaii at Manoa - Department of Economics ( email )
Honolulu, HI 96822
United States
Katerina Sherstyuk
University of Hawaii at Manoa - Department of Economics ( email )
Honolulu, HI 96822
United States
808-956-7851 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  47
Citations:  1

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