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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1274570
 
 

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What Drives Executive Stock Option Backdating?


Chris Veld


Monash University

Betty H.T. Wu


University of Glasgow Adam Smith Business School

August 31, 2013


Abstract:     
We study motives for executive stock option backdating, the practice of changing the grant dates of current options to dates in the past using hindsight. We find that smaller, younger, and less profitable firms tend to be heavier involved in backdating. These results are consistent with the retention hypothesis. In line with the incentive hypothesis, we find that backdating occurs more for options that are out-of-the-money. We derive some evidence for the agency hypothesis, in the sense that backdating companies have a larger percentage of inside directors. However, contrary to this hypothesis, we conclude that backdating firms have better protection for minority shareholders compared to firms that do not backdate.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: executive compensation, stock option grants, backdating, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G3

working papers series





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Date posted: June 7, 2010 ; Last revised: March 7, 2014

Suggested Citation

Veld, Chris and Wu, Betty H.T., What Drives Executive Stock Option Backdating? (August 31, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1274570 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1274570

Contact Information

Chris Veld
Monash University ( email )
Building 11E
Clayton, Victoria 3800
Australia
Betty H.T. Wu (Contact Author)
University of Glasgow Adam Smith Business School ( email )
Glasgow, Scotland
United Kingdom
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