In Defense of Deontology and Kant: A Reply to van Staveren
Mark D. White
CUNY College of Staten Island
September 10, 2007
Review of Political Economy, 2009
In this note, I respond to a recent article by Irene van Staveren (2007), in which she presents a case for virtue ethics, rather than deontology or consequentialism, as the most appropriate ethical foundation for ethics. Rather than taking issue with her positive arguments for virtue ethics, I argue in defense of deontology - or, more specifically, the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. I argue that, when properly understood, Kantian ethics should not be associated solely with formal rules and obligation, but that Kant's moral system can accommodate many of the concerns of virtue ethics, such as social relations, real-world context, and human fallibility, as well as embodying a unique emphasis on human dignity and judgment.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 13Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 28, 2008
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