A Malthusian Analysis of the So-Called Dynasty Trust
University of North Carolina School of Law
Jeffrey Lynch Harrison
University of Florida - Fredric G. Levin College of Law
UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1276224
University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 2008-04
Select financial institutions and members of the Bar have seized upon the presence of the limited exemption from the generation skipping transfer tax provided under the Internal Revenue Code to promote so-called dynasty trusts as a means whereby individuals can build dynastic wealth for a family forever free from transfer taxes. To realize such benefits, the trust must be governed by state law that does not impose the Rule Against Perpetuities. The promise of dynastic wealth is unlikely to be realized due to several factors. Administrative and tax costs are likely to reduce the yield on such trusts to a level where inflation, rising expectations and an ever growing band of beneficiaries are typically assured to outpace the ability of the trust to deliver the benefits anticipated by trust settlors.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 41working papers series
Date posted: October 3, 2008 ; Last revised: February 25, 2015
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