Negotiating (in the Shadow of a) European Private Law
Alain Laurent P. G. Verbeke
University of Leuven, Faculty of Law, Department of Private Law; Harvard Law School; University of Leuven, Faculty of Psychology; Tilburg Law School Department of Private Law and TISCO; Catholic University of Portugal (UCP) - Católica Global School of Law; University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) ; Greenille (Attorneys, Notaries and Tax Advisors; Brussels, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Rotterdam)
October 2, 2008
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 395-413, 2008
Ticom Working Paper on Comparative and Transnational Law No. 2008/9
The outcome of any negotiation, dispute or rulemaking, is to a certain extent influenced by rules and precedents. Moreover, clear and predictable rules may protect the weaker party in a negotiation because, as objective standards, these rules impact the distributive issues at stake, and contribute to the outcome fairness of the agreement. Applied to the field of European private law, the author argues for a more consistent approach to harmonisation, taking into account insights from negotiation theory and process building.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: European private law, Negotiation theoryAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 5, 2008 ; Last revised: February 2, 2011
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.313 seconds