Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination - Large-Scale Experimental Evidence

45 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2008

See all articles by Francesco Feri

Francesco Feri

University of London - Royal Holloway College

Bernd Irlenbusch

London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2008

Abstract

The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision-making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present an experiment with 825 participants, using six different coordination games, where either individuals or teams interact with each other. We find that teams coordinate much more efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model.

Keywords: Coordination games, Individual decision-making, Team decision-making, Experience-weighted attraction learning, Experiment

JEL Classification: C71, C91, C92

Suggested Citation

Feri, Francesco and Irlenbusch, Bernd and Sutter, Matthias, Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination - Large-Scale Experimental Evidence (September 2008). IZA Discussion Paper No. 3741, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1277169 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1277169

Francesco Feri

University of London - Royal Holloway College ( email )

Royal Holloway
University of London
Egham, TW200EX

HOME PAGE: http://francescoferi.xoom.it/

Bernd Irlenbusch

London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7955 7840 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7955 6887 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/management/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Matthias Sutter (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
95
Abstract Views
1,168
Rank
342,626
PlumX Metrics