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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1277205
 
 

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Beyond the Cartel Law Handbook: How Corruption, Social Norms and Collectivist Business Cultures Can Undermine Conventional Enforcement Tools


Andreas Stephan


University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy

September 30, 2008

ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper No. 08-29

Abstract:     
The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in the US. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these 'conventional' enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. The purpose of this paper is to widen the debate on cartel enforcement by identifying three issues which can undermine their effectiveness in some jurisdictions: (1) Corruption and organised crime; (2) Social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (3) Collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: cartels, leniency programmes, enforcement, corruption, organised crime, social norms, collectivism

JEL Classification: D21, K21, K42, L40, Z1

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Date posted: October 5, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Stephan, Andreas, Beyond the Cartel Law Handbook: How Corruption, Social Norms and Collectivist Business Cultures Can Undermine Conventional Enforcement Tools (September 30, 2008). ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper No. 08-29. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1277205 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1277205

Contact Information

Andreas Stephan (Contact Author)
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )
UEA
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
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