Beyond the Cartel Law Handbook: How Corruption, Social Norms and Collectivist Business Cultures Can Undermine Conventional Enforcement Tools
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
September 30, 2008
ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper No. 08-29
The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in the US. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these 'conventional' enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. The purpose of this paper is to widen the debate on cartel enforcement by identifying three issues which can undermine their effectiveness in some jurisdictions: (1) Corruption and organised crime; (2) Social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (3) Collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26
Keywords: cartels, leniency programmes, enforcement, corruption, organised crime, social norms, collectivism
JEL Classification: D21, K21, K42, L40, Z1working papers series
Date posted: October 5, 2008
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