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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1280505
 
 

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Vertical Mergers


Jeffrey Church


University of Calgary - Economics

2008

ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, Vol. 2, p. 1455, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2008

Abstract:     
This chapter provides an overview of the economics of vertical mergers. The overview strongly supports, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, a presumption that vertical mergers are welfare enhancing and good for consumers. However, vertical mergers can be anticompetitive if they result in either foreclosure or enhanced coordination. The difficult challenge for enforcement policy is effectively distinguishing between anticompetitive and procompetitive transactions. The economics of vertical mergers can provide a basis for this distinction and thus inform optimal enforcement policy and the nature of vertical merger enforcement guidelines.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: Vertical Merger

JEL Classification: L40

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Date posted: October 8, 2008 ; Last revised: October 11, 2008

Suggested Citation

Church, Jeffrey, Vertical Mergers (2008). ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, Vol. 2, p. 1455, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2008 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1280505

Contact Information

Jeffrey Church (Contact Author)
University of Calgary - Economics ( email )
2500 University Drive, NW
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4
Canada
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