University of Calgary - Economics
ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, Vol. 2, p. 1455, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2008
This chapter provides an overview of the economics of vertical mergers. The overview strongly supports, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, a presumption that vertical mergers are welfare enhancing and good for consumers. However, vertical mergers can be anticompetitive if they result in either foreclosure or enhanced coordination. The difficult challenge for enforcement policy is effectively distinguishing between anticompetitive and procompetitive transactions. The economics of vertical mergers can provide a basis for this distinction and thus inform optimal enforcement policy and the nature of vertical merger enforcement guidelines.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 47
Keywords: Vertical Merger
JEL Classification: L40Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 8, 2008 ; Last revised: October 11, 2008
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