Access to Justice and Litigation Trade-Off: A Theoretical Analysis
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE); Bocconi University - Centre for Research on Monetary and Financial Economics ; Università Milano-Bicocca
October 1, 2008
Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2008-29
CLEA 2008 Meetings Paper
This paper presents a simple model of disputes resolution both from a macro-perspective (social planner's problem) and from a micro-perspective (parties' choice). Furthermore, it analyzes the effects of a number of policies on: a) victim's access to justice, b) parties' choice between settlement and litigation, c) social costs of disputes resolution. Our research extends the existing literature by showing that reducing litigation rate is not always socially efficient. Rather, in many cases, a social trade-off exists between curbing litigation and enhancing access to justice. Using this framework, we derive policy implications for access to justice and judicial economy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: access to justice, litigation, legal aid, uncertainty
JEL Classification: K41working papers series
Date posted: October 11, 2008
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