Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence?
New York University School of Law; University of Oxford
October 8, 2008
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 08-35
General jurisprudence purports to consider law in general. But to break out of the arid abstractions of analytic legal philosophy, it may be worth also giving some jurisprudential consideration to the distinctive features of law in the context of a particular kind of political system. This paper considers the jurisprudence of law in a modern democracy. It explores a suggestion (made by Ronald Dworkin and others) that legal positivism might be a theory particularly apt for a democracy. And it explores the meaning and significance for democratic political theory of ideas like the generality of law, the separation of law and morality, the sources thesis, and law's public orientation. At the very end, the paper also considers Jean-Jacques Rousseau's view that the word "law" should be confined to measures that are applicable to all, made by all, and enacted in the spirit of a general will.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 58
Keywords: analytic legal philosophy, democracy, Hart, jurisprudence, legal positivism, Rousseau, separation of law and morality, sources of law,working papers series
Date posted: October 8, 2008 ; Last revised: November 12, 2008
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.437 seconds