Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1281626
 
 

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Understanding Mass Tort Defendant Incentives for Confidential Settlements: Lessons from Bayer's Cerivastatin Litigation Strategy


James M. Anderson


RAND Corporation

September 9, 2008

RAND Working Paper Series No. WR- 617-ICJ
U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research

Abstract:     
Settlement agreements that require a plaintiff not to disclose or publicize any information about her claim are both common and controversial. Under some conditions, however, a mass tort defendant will rationally choose to discourage such secrecy. A defendant can use publicity to act as a commitment device akin to a most-favored-nation agreement to increase its bargaining power with plaintiffs. The paper uses the real world example of Bayer's cerivastatin litigation as a case study to illustrate this theory in practice and to explore the public policy implications of this finding.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

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Date posted: October 15, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Anderson, James M., Understanding Mass Tort Defendant Incentives for Confidential Settlements: Lessons from Bayer's Cerivastatin Litigation Strategy (September 9, 2008). RAND Working Paper Series No. WR- 617-ICJ; U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1281626 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1281626

Contact Information

James M. Anderson (Contact Author)
RAND Corporation ( email )
4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665
United States
412 683-2300 (Phone)
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