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Agency Risk and Firm Valuation: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capitalists' Private Expectations


Thomas Hartmann-Wendels


University of Cologne - Department of Banking

Georg Keienburg


University of Cologne

Soenke Sievers


University of Cologne

October 11, 2008

AFFI/EUROFIDAI, Paris December 2009 Finance International Meeting AFFI - EUROFIDAI Paper

Abstract:     
This study empirically evaluates the price impact of agency risk in firm valuation. Using a unique data set comprised of internal valuation documents, we find that venture capitalists use risk discounts to cope with expected agency risks. These effects are economically large: e.g., whenever investors deem the management team inexperienced or recent performance inadequate, a firm’s equity value drops by 17-25%. This effect is robust to i) controlling for private business risk expectations, ii) controlling for financial statement data, firm and market characteristics, and iii) examining the effect of financial contracting mechanisms to reduce agency risks.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: agency risk, firm valuation, venture capital

JEL Classification: G24, G34

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Date posted: October 12, 2008 ; Last revised: August 28, 2012

Suggested Citation

Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas, Keienburg, Georg and Sievers, Soenke, Agency Risk and Firm Valuation: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capitalists' Private Expectations (October 11, 2008). AFFI/EUROFIDAI, Paris December 2009 Finance International Meeting AFFI - EUROFIDAI Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1282674 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1282674

Contact Information

Thomas Hartmann-Wendels
University of Cologne - Department of Banking ( email )
Albertus-Magnus-Platz
D-50923 Cologne
Germany
Georg Keienburg
University of Cologne ( email )
Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany
0049-221-470-4432 (Phone)
Soenke Sievers (Contact Author)
University of Cologne ( email )
c/o Seminar für ABWL und Controlling
Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany
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