Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285084
 
 

References (152)



 
 

Citations (15)



 


 



Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting


Ashwini K. Agrawal


New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

July 1, 2011

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcomin
NYU Stern Working Paper Series No. Fin-08-006

Abstract:     
Labor union pension funds have become increasingly vocal in governance matters; however, their motives are subject to fierce debate. I examine the proxy votes of AFL-CIO union funds around an exogenous change in the union representation of workers across firms. AFL-CIO affiliated shareholders become significantly less opposed to directors once the AFL-CIO labor organization no longer represents a firm’s workers. Other institutional investors including mutual funds and public pension funds do not exhibit similar voting behavior. Union opposition is also associated with negative valuation effects. The data suggest that some investors pursue worker interests rather than maximize shareholder value alone.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors, Proxy Voting, Board of Directors, Labor Union

JEL Classification: G30, G34, G38, J50, J52, J53

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: October 16, 2008 ; Last revised: August 29, 2011

Suggested Citation

Agrawal, Ashwini K., Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting (July 1, 2011). Review of Financial Studies, Forthcomin; NYU Stern Working Paper Series No. Fin-08-006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285084

Contact Information

Ashwini K. Agrawal (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,770
Downloads: 572
Download Rank: 25,899
References:  152
Citations:  15

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.531 seconds