'Which is to Be Master,' the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers
Mercer University - Walter F. George School of Law
October 15, 2008
UCLA Law Review, Vol. 56, 2009
Statutory interpretation is at the cutting edge of legal scholarship and, now, legislative activity. As legislatures have increasingly begun to perceive judges as activist meddlers, some legislatures have found a creative solution to the perceived control problem: statutory directives. Statutory directives, simply put, tell judges how to interpret statutes. Rather than wait for an interpretation with which they disagree, legislatures use statutory directives to control judicial interpretation.
Legislatures are constitutionally empowered to draft statutes. In doing so, legislatures expect to control the meaning of the words they choose. Moreover, they prefer to do so early in the process, not after a judge has interpreted the statute in a way they did not expect or intend. Judges are constitutionally empowered to interpret statutes without legislative-micromanagement. The question then is how to balance these valid, but competing, constitutional roles. This article explores when statutory directives violate separation of powers and concludes that when the legislature tries to control the process of interpretation, as opposed to trying to influence the outcome of interpretation to promote specific policy objectives, the legislature aggrandizes itself, oversteps constitutional boundaries, impermissibly intrudes into the judicial sphere, and becomes master of the interpretive process.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 76
Keywords: statutory interpretation, statutory directive, separation of powers, functionalism, formalism
JEL Classification: K00Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 17, 2008
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