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Does Mandatory Loan Review Affect Mortgage Contract Choice and Performance?


Sumit Agarwal


National University of Singapore

Gene Amromin


Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Itzhak Ben-David


Ohio State University - Fisher College of Business, Finance Department

Souphala Chomsisengphet


Government of the United States of America - Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)

Douglas D. Evanoff


Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

April 29, 2011

Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2008-03-019
Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2008-20
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2009-04
EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper
AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper
Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2009-51
FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. 2009-7
Networks Financial Institute Working Paper 2011-WP-12

Abstract:     
We explore the effects of mandatory third-party review of mortgage contracts on the terms, availability, and performance of mortgage credit. Our study is based on a legislative pilot carried out by the State of Illinois in a selected set of zip codes in 2006. Mortgage applicants with low FICO scores were required to attend loan reviews by financial counselors. Applicants with higher FICO scores had to attend counseling only if they chose “risky mortgages.” We find that low-FICO applicants for whom counselor review was mandatory did not materially change their contract choice. Conversely, applicants who could avoid counseling by choosing less risky mortgages did so. Although ex post default rates among low-FICO borrowers in the pilot program declined by 25%, we find that the educational component of counselor review played only a minor role. Instead, external review presented strong incentives for lenders to impose tighter ex ante screening on low-credit-quality borrowers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Financial counseling, Screening,Subprime crisis, Household finance

JEL Classification: D14, D18, L85, R21

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Date posted: October 20, 2008 ; Last revised: May 14, 2011

Suggested Citation

Agarwal, Sumit, Amromin, Gene, Ben-David, Itzhak, Chomsisengphet, Souphala and Evanoff, Douglas D., Does Mandatory Loan Review Affect Mortgage Contract Choice and Performance? (April 29, 2011). Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2008-03-019; Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2008-20; FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2009-04; EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper; AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper; Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2009-51; FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. 2009-7; Networks Financial Institute Working Paper 2011-WP-12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285603 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1285603

Contact Information

Sumit Agarwal
National University of Singapore ( email )
15 Kent Ridge Drive
Singapore, 117592
Singapore
8118 9025 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ushakrisna.com
Gene Amromin
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ( email )
230 South LaSalle Street
230 S. LaSalle
Chicago, IL 60604
United States
3123225368 (Phone)
3123226011 (Fax)
Itzhak Ben-David (Contact Author)
Ohio State University - Fisher College of Business, Finance Department ( email )
2100 Neil Avenue
Fisher 700D
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States
773 988 1353 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://fisher.osu.edu/fin/faculty/Ben-David/index.htm

Souphala Chomsisengphet
Government of the United States of America - Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) ( email )
250 E Street, SW
Washington, DC 20219
United States
202-874-5386 (Phone)
Douglas D. Evanoff
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ( email )
230 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
United States
312-322-5814 (Phone)
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