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Goal Setting as a Self-Regulation Mechanism


Anton Suvorov


New Economic School; Centre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)

Jeroen Van de Ven


University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

October 17, 2008


Abstract:     
We develop a theory of self-regulation based on goal setting for an agent with present-biased preferences. Preferences are assumed to be reference-dependent and exhibit loss aversion, as in prospect theory. The reference point is determined endogenously as an optimal self-sustaining goal. The interaction between hyperbolic discounting and loss aversion makes goals a credible and effective instrument for self-regulation. This is an entirely internal commitment device that does not rely on reputation building. We show that in some cases it is optimal to engage in indulgent behavior, and sometimes it is optimal to set seemingly dysfunctional goals. Finally, we derive a condition under which proximal (short term) goals are better than distal (long term) goals. Our results provide an implicit evolutionary rationale for the existence of loss aversion as a means of self-control.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: self-regulation, goals, time inconsistency, loss aversion, indulgence, compulsiveness, proximal and distal

JEL Classification: D00, D80, D90

working papers series


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Date posted: October 20, 2008 ; Last revised: June 9, 2009

Suggested Citation

Suvorov, Anton and Van de Ven, Jeroen , Goal Setting as a Self-Regulation Mechanism (October 17, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1286029 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1286029

Contact Information

Anton Suvorov
New Economic School ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow
Russia
Centre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)
47 Nakhimovsky Prospect, Office #720
117418 Moscow
Russia
Jeroen Van de Ven (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam ( email )
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
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