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Buy High, Sell Low: How Listed Firms Price Asset Transfers in Related Party Transactions
Steven Yan-Leung Cheung City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) - Department of Economics & Finance Raghavendra Rau Purdue University; Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley Aris Stouraitis City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) - Department of Economics & Finance Yuehua Qi affiliation not provided to SSRN September 20, 2008 Abstract: We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms' length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998-2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavorable prices compared to similar arms' length deals. Firms acquire assets from related parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms' length deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms' length deals. With the exception of audit committees, corporate governance characteristics have limited impact on transaction prices. Firms with audit committees on their boards pay lower prices to related parties for acquisitions and receive higher prices from related parties from divestments.
Keywords: International corporate governance, Expropriation, Related party transactions, Tunneling JEL Classifications: G15, G34, K33 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: October 20, 2008 ; Last revised: November 03, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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