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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1288320
 
 

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Dynastic Cycle: A Generic Structure Describing Resource Allocation in Political Economies, Markets and Firms


Khalid Saeed


Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI)

Oleg V. Pavlov


Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) - Department of Social Science & Policy Studies

2008

Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 59, pp. 1289-1298, 2008

Abstract:     
A generic system embodies basic principles and insights that are common to a set of diverse cases and situations. For example, a generic system called "limits to growth" captures the constraints experienced by an organization due to the scarcity of an important resource. Its manifestations range from the tragedy of Easter Island to the spotty performance of early peer-to-peer music networks. This paper presents a new generic system that we name the dynastic cycle structure. It is based on a stylized model of events from the Chinese history. It describes resource allocation between social, asocial and control uses in a variety of institutions, including political economies, markets and firms that experience cyclical behavior and homeostasis symbolizing low levels of performance. Numerical simulations with the model are used to test several policy scenarios.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: system dynamics, political economy, dynastic cycle, systems, simulation

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Date posted: October 24, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Saeed, Khalid and Pavlov, Oleg V., Dynastic Cycle: A Generic Structure Describing Resource Allocation in Political Economies, Markets and Firms (2008). Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 59, pp. 1289-1298, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1288320

Contact Information

Khalid Saeed
Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) ( email )
Worcester, MA 01609
United States
Oleg V. Pavlov (Contact Author)
Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) - Department of Social Science & Policy Studies ( email )
100 Institute Road
Worcester, MA 01609
United States
508-831-5234 (Phone)
508-831-5892 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://users.wpi.edu/~opavlov/
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