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Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based PreferencesAlvin E. RothHBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Tayfun SonmezBoston College - Department of Economics M. Utku ÜnverBoston College - Department of Economics October 1, 2006 American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2007 Abstract: Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than 3-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 47 JEL Classification: JEL C78, D02, D51, D78, I10 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: October 28, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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