Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290350
 
 

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Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences


Alvin E. Roth


HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Tayfun Sonmez


Boston College - Department of Economics

M. Utku Ünver


Boston College - Department of Economics

October 1, 2006

American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2007

Abstract:     
Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than 3-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

JEL Classification: JEL C78, D02, D51, D78, I10

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Date posted: October 28, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Roth, Alvin E. and Sonmez, Tayfun and Ünver, M. Utku, Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences (October 1, 2006). American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290350

Contact Information

Alvin E. Roth
HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-5447 (Phone)
617-496-7379 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Tayfun Oguz Sonmez
Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
Utku Unver (Contact Author)
Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )
140 Commonwealth Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
+1 (617) 552 2217 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver
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