Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291605
 
 

References (26)



 
 

Citations (40)



 


 



Hedge Fund Activism


April Klein


New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting, Taxation & Business Law

Emanuel Zur


University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business

October 2006

NYU Working Paper No. CLB-06-017

Abstract:     
This paper examines the causes and consequences of hedge fund activism. Hedge funds target profitable and healthy firms, with above-average cash holdings. The target firms earn significantly higher abnormal stock returns around the initial 13D filing date than a sample of control firm. However, they do not show improvements in accounting performances in the year after the initial purchase. Instead, hedge funds extract cash from the firm through increases in the target s debt capacity and higher dividends. Examination of proxy fights and threats accompanying the activist campaign suggests that hedge fund managers achieve their goals by posing a credible threat of engaging the target in a costly proxy solicitation contest.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

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Date posted: October 31, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Klein, April and Zur, Emanuel, Hedge Fund Activism (October 2006). NYU Working Paper No. CLB-06-017. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291605

Contact Information

April Klein (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting, Taxation & Business Law ( email )
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
Emanuel Zur
University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )
College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States
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References:  26
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