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Has Collusion Returned to Baseball? Analyzing Whether a Concerted Increase in Free Agent Player Supply Would Violate Baseball's "Collusion Clause"

Marc Edelman
Barry Law School



Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 24, p. 59, 2004

Abstract:     
This article argues that a concerted agreement among baseball clubs to increase the supply of free agent players violates baseball's collusion clause, and therefore, MLB clubs are at risk of losing another collusion grievance. Part I of this article explains the evolution of baseball's collusion clause and discusses three past collusion grievances filed by the MLBPA in the 1980s. Part II explains baseball's collusion-free period, which began with the settlement of 1980s collusion disputes. Part III discusses why MLB clubs may have again violated the "collusion clause" in the 2002-03 off-season.

Keywords: baseball, Major League Baseball, collusion, labor, antitrust, sports, sports law, sports economics

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: October 30, 2008 ; Last revised: April 28, 2009

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Marc, Has Collusion Returned to Baseball? Analyzing Whether a Concerted Increase in Free Agent Player Supply Would Violate Baseball's "Collusion Clause" (Fall 2004). Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 24, p. 59, 2004 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291886


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Contact Information

Marc Edelman (Contact Author)
Barry Law School ( email )
6441 East Colonial Drive
Orlando, FL 32807
United States
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