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Has Collusion Returned to Baseball? Analyzing Whether a Concerted Increase in Free Agent Player Supply Would Violate Baseball's "Collusion Clause"


Marc Edelman


Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York; Fordham University School of Law

Fall 2004

Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 24, p. 59, 2004

Abstract:     
This article argues that a concerted agreement among baseball clubs to increase the supply of free agent players violates baseball's collusion clause, and therefore, MLB clubs are at risk of losing another collusion grievance. Part I of this article explains the evolution of baseball's collusion clause and discusses three past collusion grievances filed by the MLBPA in the 1980s. Part II explains baseball's collusion-free period, which began with the settlement of 1980s collusion disputes. Part III discusses why MLB clubs may have again violated the "collusion clause" in the 2002-03 off-season.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: baseball, Major League Baseball, collusion, labor, antitrust, sports, sports law, sports economics

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Date posted: October 30, 2008 ; Last revised: April 28, 2009

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Marc, Has Collusion Returned to Baseball? Analyzing Whether a Concerted Increase in Free Agent Player Supply Would Violate Baseball's "Collusion Clause" (Fall 2004). Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 24, p. 59, 2004 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291886

Contact Information

Marc Edelman (Contact Author)
Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York ( email )
One Bernard Baruch Way
Box B9-220
New York, NY 10010
United States
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
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