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Why the 'Single Entity' Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A Primer on Property Rights Theory in Professional Sports

Marc Edelman
Barry Law School



Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2008

Abstract:     
This article argues that as a matter of law and economics, clubs in the four premier American sports leagues lack sufficient unity of interest for any court to classify them as "single entities." Part I of this article discusses the contemporary law-and-economics theory underlying the allocation of private and common property. Part II explains the three different property-rights systems that have emerged in American professional sports: (1) the pure private property system (no unity of interest); (2) the pure common property system (complete unity of interest); and (3) the mixed-mode system (partial unity of interest). Part III describes the contractual underpinnings of the mixed-mode property system, as that system applies to the four premier American sports leagues. Part IV analyzes the allocation of property rights in the mixed-mode system and explains why sports clubs operating in that system cannot form a "single-entity" league.

Keywords: sports law, antitrust, Sherman Act, single entity, Copperweld, American Needle, licensing, National Football League, NFL, NFL Properties

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: October 30, 2008 ; Last revised: November 13, 2008

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Marc, Why the 'Single Entity' Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A Primer on Property Rights Theory in Professional Sports (2008). Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291974


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Marc Edelman (Contact Author)
Barry Law School ( email )
6441 East Colonial Drive
Orlando, FL 32807
United States
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