Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1294147
 
 

References (29)



 
 

Citations (11)



 


 



Bottom-Up Corporate Governance


Augustin Landier


Toulouse School of Economics

David Thesmar


HEC Paris - Finance Department

March 2005

NYU Working Paper No. FIN-05-011

Abstract:     
In many instances, �independently minded� top ranking executives can imposestrong discipline on their CEO, even though they are formally under his authority.This paper argues that the use of such a disciplining mechanism is a key feature ofgood corporate governance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

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Date posted: November 3, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Landier, Augustin and Thesmar, David, Bottom-Up Corporate Governance (March 2005). NYU Working Paper No. FIN-05-011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1294147

Contact Information

Augustin Landier (Contact Author)
Toulouse School of Economics ( email )
Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France
David Thesmar
HEC Paris (Groupe HEC) - Finance Department ( email )
1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France
+33 1 39 67 94 12 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.hec.fr/hec/eng/professeurs_recherche/p_liste/p_fiche.php?num=135

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References:  29
Citations:  11

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