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Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors


David Yermack


NYU Stern School of Business

October 2002

NYU Working Paper No. S-CG-02-08

Abstract:     
I study incentives received by outside directors in Fortune 500 firms from compensation,replacement, and the opportunity to obtain other directorships. Changes over time in the valueof equity compensation create considerable variation in director pay. Board members of the most successful firms earn millions of dollars within their first five years, a marked change in the historical pattern of rewards for directors. I also find statistically significant evidence thatoutside directors replacement and total board seats held are associated generally with company performance. Previous research had only shown these relations to apply under extreme circumstances such as financial distress.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

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Date posted: November 4, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Yermack, David, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors (October 2002). NYU Working Paper No. S-CG-02-08. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295258

Contact Information

David Yermack (Contact Author)
NYU Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0357 (Phone)
212-995-4220 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~dyermack
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