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On Rescissions in Executive Stock OptionsMenachem BrennerNew York University (NYU) - Department of Finance Rangarajan K. SundaramNew York University (NYU) - Department of Finance David YermackNYU Stern School of Business April 2002 NYU Working Paper No. S-CG-02-05 Abstract: We study executive stock options that permit the option holder to rescind an exercise decision, returning the shares acquired to the company and obtaining a refund of the exercise price. Rescissions occurred at a number of U.S. companies in 2000 after the large decline in internet stocks, and have been widely condemned as a weakening of incentives. To the contrary, we find that in many situations rescindable options dominate ordinary options by delivering greater value and stronger incentives to the employee at a lower cost to the firm. The attractiveness of rescindable options arises as a consequence of the income tax treatment of most executive stock options in the U.S.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32 working papers seriesDate posted: November 4, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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