Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295808
 
 

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Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design


Roman Inderst


University of Frankfurt; Imperial College London

Holger M. Müller


affiliation not provided to SSRN

November 2002

NYU Working Paper No. S-CDM-02-13

Abstract:     
This paper considers the potential cost of subjective judgment and discretion in credit decisions. We show that subjectivity and discretion in the evaluation of borrowers create an incentive problem on the part of the lender. The lender s incentives to accept or reject a borrower depend only on the value of her own claims, not on the total value of the project. Unless the lender obtains the full NPV her credit decision is too conservative, i.e., she uses too high a hurdle rate. Given this problem we show that the unique optimal security is standard debt. Among all securities debt is the one that makes the lender the least conservative, thus providing her with optimal incentives to trade otype-1 and type-2 errors. Among other things, this suggests that the common folk wisdom whereby giving banks equity makes them less cautious in their credit decisions is generally not correct.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

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Date posted: November 5, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Inderst, Roman and Müller, Holger M., Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design (November 2002). NYU Working Paper No. S-CDM-02-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295808

Contact Information

Roman Inderst (Contact Author)
University of Frankfurt ( email )
Grüneburgplatz 1 (H11)
Frankfurt am Main, DE 60323
Germany
+49 (69) 798-34023 (Phone)
+49 (69) 798-33912 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.finance.uni-frankfurt.de/inderst/index.php?lg=1&men=2&case=prof
Imperial College London ( email )
South Kensington Campus
London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom
Holger M. Müller
affiliation not provided to SSRN
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN


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Citations:  5

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