Tacit versus Overt Collusion Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: What's the Evidence?
S. W. Davies
University of East Anglia (UEA)
University of East Anglia
October 31, 2008
ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper No. 08-32
It is conventional wisdom that collusion is more likely the fewer firms there are in a market and the more symmetric they are. This is often theoretically justified in terms of a repeated non-cooperative game. Although that model fits more easily with tacit than overt collusion, the impression sometimes given is that 'one model fits all'. Moreover, the empirical literature offers few stylised facts on the most simple of questions - how few are few and how symmetric is symmetric? This paper attempts to fill this gap while also exploring the interface of tacit and overt collusion, albeit in an indirect way. First, it identifies the empirical model of tacit collusion that the European Commission appears to have employed in coordinated effects merger cases - apparently only fairly symmetric duopolies fit the bill. Second, it shows that, intriguingly, the same story emerges from the quite different experimental literature on tacit collusion. This offers a stark contrast with the findings for a sample of prosecuted cartels; on average, these involve six members (often more) and size asymmetries among members are often considerable. The indirect nature of this 'evidence' cautions against definitive conclusions; nevertheless, the contrast offers little comfort for those who believe that the same model does, more or less, fit all.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26
Keywords: tacit collusion, collective dominance, coordinated effects, cartels, European mergers, asymmetries, firm numbers
JEL Classification: L13, L41working papers series
Date posted: November 5, 2008
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