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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296962
 
 

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Rethinking Delaware's Corporate Opportunity Doctrine


Stephen M. Bainbridge


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

November 6, 2008

UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 08-17

Abstract:     
Although the prohibition on taking of organizational opportunities is well established, the standards applied to this problem in corporate law disputes are vague and imprecise. Corporate directors and officers lack clear guidance as to when a particular business venture may be taken for themselves or must first be offered to the corporation. In this article, I review the relevant Delaware case law, focusing on the ambiguities inherent therein. I then offer a proposed alternative regime, providing greater certainty and predictability.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: corporate opportunity doctrine, fiduciary duties, directors, officers

JEL Classification: K22

working papers series





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Date posted: November 9, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Bainbridge, Stephen M., Rethinking Delaware's Corporate Opportunity Doctrine (November 6, 2008). UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 08-17. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296962 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1296962

Contact Information

Stephen Mark Bainbridge (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-206-1599 (Phone)
310-825-6023 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.professorbainbridge.com
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