Abstract

 
 

Citations (4)



 
 

Footnotes (91)



 


 



The Better Regulation Initiative at the Judicial Gate: A Trojan Horse within the Commission's Walls or the Way Forward?


Alberto Alemanno


HEC Paris - Law Department

November 7, 2008

European Law Journal, 2009

Abstract:     
While most academic attention is currently being paid to the goals and to the merits of the Better Regulation initiative (BR), this article examines the most immediate legal implications stemming from reliance on the main tools of BR (such as systematic impact analysis and consultation procedures on proposed legislation) within the European legal order. Since the BR package boils down into a set of regulatory requirements, enforcement issues are likely to arise. For instance, what if the Commission omits to undertake (or badly performs) an impact assessment (IA) of a legislative proposal? Who is currently in charge of ensuring the Commission's compliance with these requirements? After illustrating the existing administrative oversight mechanisms designed to ensure effective compliance with BR requirements, by focusing notably on the recently-established Impact Assessment Board, the article examines to what extent the European courts may be called upon to review the respect paid to the requirements of BR by the Commission services. To prevent the BR initiative from turning into a Trojan Horse within its own walls, the Commission is likely to comply with these regulatory requirements, thereby paving the way for the initiative's success.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: EU law, Better Regulation, Regulatory oversight, European Ombudsman, Judicial Review, EU Courts

JEL Classification: K00, K20, K23, K33, K40, K41, L50

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 9, 2008 ; Last revised: March 1, 2013

Suggested Citation

Alemanno, Alberto, The Better Regulation Initiative at the Judicial Gate: A Trojan Horse within the Commission's Walls or the Way Forward? (November 7, 2008). European Law Journal, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1297170

Contact Information

Alberto Alemanno (Contact Author)
HEC Paris - Law Department ( email )
1 rue de la Libération
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 627
Downloads: 210
Download Rank: 70,392
Citations:  4
Footnotes:  91

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.391 seconds