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A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction

Elmar Wolfstetter
Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); World Bank; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce

Motty Perry
Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality; Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of Economic

Shmuel Zamir
Hebrew University - Center for the Study of Rationality

February 2000

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 249

Abstract:
This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.

JEL Classifications: D44

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Elmar G. Wolfstetter (Contact Author) Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email ) Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I Spandauer Strasse 1 Berlin Germany +49 30 2093 5652/3 (Phone) +49 30 2093 5619 (Fax) HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wt1/
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Poschinger Str. 5 DE-81679 Munich Germany HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
World Bank ( email ) 1818 H Street NW Washington, DC 20433 United States 202-458-5426 (Phone)
Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce ( email ) Anam-dong, Sungbuk-Ku Seoul 136-701 Korea
Motty Perry Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality ( email ) Feldman Building Givat-Ram 91904 Jerusalem Israel
Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of Economic ( email ) 524 Kern Graduate Building University Park, PA 16802-3306 United States
Shmuel Zamir Hebrew University - Center for the Study of Rationality ( email ) Hebrew University Jerusalem 91904 Israel +972 2-6586486 (Phone)